Taxation and FDI In Developed and Developing Countries by Timothy J. Goodspeed
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxation and FDI 
In Developed and Developing Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
Timothy J. Goodspeed ∗ 
  
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
 From 1980 to 2000, foreign direct investment (FDI) increased substantially in the 
world.  According to statistics from UNCTAD, the world inward stock of FDI was $0.7 
trillion in 1980, $1.95 trillion in 1990, and $6.15 trillion in 2000.  Corresponding figures 
for the world outward stock of FDI are $0.56, $1.76, and $5.99 trillion, respectively.  
Developed countries are the generators of the vast majority of FDI outflows (86% of the 
world stock in 2000), and the receivers of the vast majority of inflows (65% of the world 
stock in 2000).  However, the shares of developing countries, whose FDI inflows come 
mainly from developed countries, are increasing.  The inward FDI stock of developing 
countries has risen from 28% of the world stock in 1990 to 33% in 2000, while their 
share of the world outward stock has risen from 7% to 13% during this period. 
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 Table 1 shows that along with an increase in the world share of FDI stock, 
developing countries have seen a greater real per-capita GDP growth rate than developed 
countries from 1990 to 2000, in line with economic theory which predicts that capital 
accumulation is important for growth.  The real per-capita GDP growth rate in 
developing countries was 2.9% from 1990 to 2001, while that for developed countries 
was 1.7%.  However, in spite of their increasing share of FDI and higher real per-capita 
growth rate, developing countries’ corporate tax revenues have fallen as a share of GDP.  
Keen and Simone (2004) report that developing country corporate tax revenues as a 
percent of GDP fell from 2.9% in 1992 to 2.3% in 2001.  This was partly due to a 
reduction in statutory tax rates in developing as well as developed countries.  Yet 
developed countries were able to increase their corporate tax revenue as a percent of GDP 
from 1.9% in 1992 to 2.5% in 2001. 
 In this paper, we first look at an overview of FDI, noting certain differences 
between developed and developing countries, differences in the composition of FDI 
within a country, and differences in the geographic origin of inward FDI.  We also note 
differences in FDI incentives between developing and developed countries.  We then turn 
to a discussion of the complicated ways in which FDI incentives can be affected by the 
international tax systems of both home and host countries.  Incentives affecting 
investment decisions are treated first, followed by a discussion of income shifting 
incentives.  We conclude by summarizing the challenges that lie ahead. 
 
FDI in Developed and Developing Countries  
 Table 2 lists the 10 largest developing and developed host economies for FDI for 
2001, and their inward FDI flows between 1997 and 2001.  Among developing 
economies, China, Mexico, and Brazil had the largest inward flows, while among 
developed countries, the US, the UK, France, and Belgium and Luxembourg were the 
largest recipients of FDI flows.  In assessing the relationship between taxation and FDI in 
these diverse countries, it is important to keep in mind several factors concerning FDI.   
 First, FDI in the service sector, and particularly in finance, has increased at a 
greater rate than FDI in manufacturing.  According to the World Bank (2003), the world 
stock of inward FDI increased at an annual rate of 12.2 percent in manufacturing and 
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13.8 percent in services between 1988 and 1999.  In developing countries, the difference 
in the annual increase in the composition of the inward stock of FDI was even more 
marked: a 19.6 annual growth rate in manufacturing versus a 28.2 percent annual growth 
rate in services.  The potentially important role of the financial sector is evident in the 
data for Belgium and Luxembourg in Table 2.  While obviously small countries, in 2000 
Belgium and Luxembourg overtook Germany and came close to overtaking the US in 
total FDI inflows. 
 Second, the composition of FDI can differ significantly from country to country, 
sometimes even within regions.  Brazil, for instance, has seen greater inflows in the 
tertiary (service) sector than the secondary (manufacturing) sector in every year from 
1996 to 2002.  Mexico, while having significant inflows in the tertiary sector, had higher 
inflows in manufacturing in every year from 1994 to 2000. 
 Third, FDI inflows are geographically diverse both across host countries and 
within a given host country.  Hence, host countries need to keep in mind different home 
country tax systems when evaluating the effects of tax policy.  For instance, the bulk of 
FDI inflows into Mexico come from the United States.  While the US is also a significant 
provider of FDI in Brazil, a large part of FDI inflows in Brazil have come from Western 
Europe.  Moreover, the geographic origin of flows into Brazil have changed significantly 
during the 1990’s, with Spain, France, and the Netherlands currently the largest investors 
from Western Europe. 
 Fourth, developing countries are usually characterized by greater FDI inflows 
than outflows, while developed economies’ inflows and outflows tend to be closer, with 
FDI outward stocks often greater than inward stocks.  For instance, during the period 
1985-1995, developed economies’ inflows average $127.5 billion annually, while annual 
outflows averaged $181.7 billion.  During this same period, developing economies’ 
inflows averaged $50.1 billion annually and outflows averaged $21.5 billion.  In 2000, 
China’s inflows were $40.8 billion while outflows were only $0.9 billion.  In some sense, 
then, the challenges facing developing and developed economies are different. 
 Fifth, it is important to recognize at the outset that taxes usually are not the most 
important factor in attracting FDI, although they can have marginal impacts.  A number 
of studies have shown that an attractive investment climate including factors such as the 
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rule of law and low levels of corruption, good infrastructure, agglomeration economies, 
as well as geographic proximity, are the most important factors at work.  Moreover, the 
reputation of a country is important.  Are a country’s policies likely to be time consistent 
– that is, will tax or other incentives granted today be honored in the future, or may a 
government renege on future promises, perhaps even confiscating a company’s assets?  
Country risk is important and may be endogenously determined by government policies 
(Eaton and Gersovitz).1 
 Finally, it should be noted that FDI often has an uneven impact within a country.  
For instance, NAFTA is generally thought to have impacted Mexico unevenly, increasing 
incomes more along the wealthier northern border than in the poorer southern states.  
This can have important political ramifications as those that lose or do not gain as much 
will tend to be opposed to policies that might benefit the country as a whole.   
 
Incentives Used to Attract FDI in Developing and Developed Countries 
 Developing and developed countries both use certain incentives to try to attract 
FDI, but the types and frequency of incentives used differs somewhat.  Table 3 lists some 
of the incentives used in 71 developing versus 20 OECD countries.  Tax exemption or tax 
holidays for FDI are used by 55% of developing countries but only 20% of OECD 
countries.  Lower tax rates for FDI are used by 45% of developing countries but only 5% 
of OECD countries.  Investment or re-investment allowances are used frequently by both 
groups, though somewhat more by developing countries.  Accelerated depreciation is 
used by 30% of the countries in each group.   
 The types of incentives used more frequently by OECD countries are reduced 
local taxes and subsidized loans.  Moran (1998) suggests that developing countries do not 
have the resources to be able to compete with the large subsidies offered by developed 
countries, and resort instead to tax holidays and the like.  Shah (1995) indicates that the 
use of tax incentives has led to distorted investment decisions in many developing 
countries because of the lack of any incentive for start-ups that have losses and because 
of the encouragement of relatively capital intensive production methods.  
                                                 
1 Volatility of FDI, sometimes taken as a measure of country risk, is higher among developing than 
developed countries.  
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 The fact that reduced local taxes is a common subsidy among many OECD 
countries is troubling if one is convinced that more cooperation is in order.  Cooperation 
typically takes place among national governments and some national governments, 
particularly the U.S., have little control over subsidies of sub-national governments. 
 
Investment Incentives Under Different Systems of International 
Taxation  
 The first fact to recognize when thinking about taxation of FDI is that there are 
generally two distinct types of tax systems used by countries: territorial and worldwide 
tax systems.  The distinction between the income taxed under these two systems is 
similar to the distinction between gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national 
product (GNP).  Under territorial taxation, and similar to the definition of GDP, a country 
taxes all income generated within that country whether the taxed entity is foreign or 
domestic.  In the extreme, all income generated outside of the borders of the country is 
not taxed, as it is deemed to be taxable where it is generated.  In contrast, a worldwide 
system of taxation in principal taxes as well the income of a resident that is generated 
abroad, similar to the definition of GNP. 
 Countries that practice worldwide taxation often have a foreign tax credit system 
to relieve double taxation of foreign earned income.  A credit is given for foreign taxes 
paid, but the credit is usually limited to the tax that would have been paid had the income 
been earned in the home country.  This creates two types of resident taxpayers; those that 
receive full credit for foreign taxes paid and those that do not.  The latter group is said to 
be in Aexcess credit@; if full credit is received the taxpayer is said to be in Adeficit of 
credit@ or Aexcess limitation.@ 
 In practice, most countries do not rely exclusively on the extremes described 
above.  For instance, although the U.S. is known as a worldwide taxation country, it 
deviates from such a system in many cases.  For instance, a U.S. corporation can set up 
an overseas operation as a controlled foreign corporation (CFC), which is incorporated in 
the foreign country and for which over 50% of stock is owned by U.S. shareholders.  
Except for certain types of income taxed currently under sub-part F, the income of a CFC 
is only subject to U.S. tax when it is repatriated to the U.S.   Since a CFC can delay 
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subjecting its income to U.S. tax by not repatriating income, this feature of U.S. 
international tax law is referred to as Adeferral,@ a common practice among worldwide 
taxation countries.  Yet, at least for the time that income tax is deferred, this makes the 
U.S. tax system much like a territorial tax system. Nevertheless, countries tend to be 
classified somewhat loosely as “territorial” or “worldwide” taxation countries.   
 Whether the U.S. tax system is a truly worldwide tax system is complicated by 
other features as well.  For instance, deferral was weakened by the U.S. Revenue Act of 
1962 which added Subpart F to the tax code.  Subpart F subjects certain types of 
unrepatriated income of CFCs to U.S. tax currently, as if it had been repatriated as a 
dividend.  Another complication of the U.S. worldwide tax system is that foreign 
operations can be set up as a branch, which is not separately incorporated.  The income 
(or loss) of a foreign branch is combined with domestic income and taxed currently.  The 
companies that tend to set up foreign operations as branches are concentrated in the 
banking and petroleum industries. (Goodspeed and Frisch, 1989) 
 On the other side of the coin, Germany is often thought of as a territorial country.  
As pointed out in Altshuler and Grubert (2001), Germany actually has a worldwide tax 
system with foreign tax credits.  What distinguishes Germany is that dividend payments 
from foreign affiliates located in a country that has a tax treaty with Germany are exempt 
from German tax, effectively creating a territorial system for countries with which 
Germany has a tax treaty. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, there is not agreement on the theoretical incentive effects of 
taxes on FDI coming from tax credit countries.  One point of view, laid out by Horst 
(1977), is that incentives are different for excess credit and deficit of credit firms.  The 
excess credit firm faces the tax rate of the country in which it invests on the margin; the 
deficit of credit firm faces the tax rate of the home country no matter where it invests.  In 
contrast, Hartman (1985) argues that deferral combined with the fact that mature firms 
finance investment from retained earnings that are already abroad implies that the foreign 
tax credit position of the multinational is irrelevant for investment decisions.  In 
Hartman’s view, deferral does not help firms that invest funds that are already abroad and 
must eventually be repatriated; the return on those funds must eventually absorb the 
home country tax.  Hence, the investment rule for excess-credit and deficit of credit firms 
Taxation and FDI 
In Developed and Developing Countries 
 
 
7
is the same: invest abroad if the after-foreign-tax return is higher than the after-domestic-
tax return.  The Hartman result depends on an unchanging home tax rate among other 
things. (Altshuler and Fulghieri,1994)   Moreover, if investment from tax-credit countries 
comes mostly from excess credit multinationals, the magnitude of any difference in 
investment incentives would be small since under either view most foreign earnings 
would face the host country tax rate on the margin.  Furthermore, any difference in 
investment incentives resulting from territorial versus worldwide would likewise be small 
in magnitude.  This has also been the conclusion of a number of studies (e.g. Altshuler 
and Grubert, 2001 and Grubert, 2001) examining the hypothetical move towards a 
territorial system of taxation being contemplated by the U.S..2 
 The empirical evidence on whether tax differences influence the location of FDI 
is reviewed by Hines (1997), but the evidence is rather mixed.  This could quite possibly 
be due to the fact that any difference that tax systems (worldwide versus territorial) have 
on FDI arises from firms that are in an excess limitation position under the worldwide 
system.  Firms that are in an excess credit position face the host tax rate on the margin 
just as under the territorial system.  Thus, one might expect it to be difficult to discern 
any difference.  One paper that does find a large effect of territorial versus worldwide tax 
systems is Hines (1996) who examines locational patterns of inward FDI into the US 
states that have differing tax rates.  One reason that Hines is able to discern some 
difference between home country tax systems is that he examines a single host country.  
However, his results probably should not be extended to host countries other than the US. 
 
Incentives and the Computation of Foreign Tax Credits  
 One important difference in the computation of foreign tax credits is whether a 
per-country limitation is used.  Some countries treat income earned in each foreign 
country separately in determining a multinational’s foreign tax credit, while others 
determine the credit on a worldwide basis.  Under the former method a per-country 
limitation on foreign tax credits is computed.  Under the latter method, income and taxes 
from all countries are added to determine whether the limitation applies; thus, the 
                                                 
2 The timing of dividend repatriations might be affected, though, as emphasized in Desai, Foley, and Hines 
(2001). 
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taxpayer will be in excess credit if its (weighted) average foreign tax rate is greater than 
the home country tax rate.3  A multinational may be able to reduce its home country tax 
liability because of the averaging of high and low taxed income, a fact that is important 
for investment incentives as well as income shifting (discussed later).  Consider, for 
instance, a multinational with a large proportion of income coming from investments in 
high tax countries and a small proportion of income coming from investments in low tax 
foreign countries.  The multinational will not obtain full credit for foreign taxes paid; that 
is, it will be in an excess credit position.  This firm would then have an incentive (absent 
under a per-country limitation) to shift income from high tax to low tax foreign countries 
so that the average foreign tax rate falls. 
 This is not to say that a per-country limitation eliminates abuse possibilities.  
Since different types of investments are associated with different effective tax rates, a 
cause for concern under the per-country limitation is that income may be shifted between 
income or investment types.  To combat this tendency, some countries force 
multinational companies to make separate credit calculations for particularly high- or 
low-taxed types of income, sometimes called "baskets" of income.  Such categories can 
substantially increase the compliance costs for multinationals, however.4 
 
Tax Holidays and Tax Sparing as Investment Incentives 
 Many developing countries give multinationals Atax holidays@ meaning that they 
pay no or little taxes for a certain number of years.  Such tax breaks only provide 
incentives for multinationals to invest in the developing country if the multinational’s 
home country taxes on a source basis.  For countries that tax on a worldwide basis, tax 
holidays provide no incentive to locate in the developing country since the income of the 
                                                 
3 The extent to which countries can be classified on the basis of whether their foreign tax credit systems are 
per-country or worldwide is sometimes questioned.  Usually, the U.S., Japan, and Iceland would be 
classified as providing credits on a worldwide basis, while Canada, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom would be classified 
as using a per country limit in determining the foreign tax credit.  However, as Ault (1997) notes, this 
division is somewhat misleading.  In the U.K., for instance, the per-country credit limitation can be avoided 
by routing income through a nonresident holding company. The income going through this Amixer@ 
company is considered all from one source, and hence averaged and the per-country limitation avoided.  
Ault suggests that the use of such companies is common. 
4 For example, the expansion of baskets under TRA86 has been criticized for unduly increasing the 
compliance costs of multinationals. 
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multinational will be taxed at the home country rate. Recognizing this, some developed 
countries that tax on a worldwide basis allow their multinationals credit for such tax 
holidays; that is, they allow credit for taxes that have not actually been paid.  This is often 
referred to as Atax sparing.@  Tax sparing provisions are generally written into tax treaties 
between the developed and developing country. 
 Although most countries grant tax sparing in treaties with many developing 
countries, the U.S. does not.5  There is some evidence that tax sparing does influence the 
location of Japanese investment (Hines, 2001b).  Tax sparing does not benefit start-up 
companies that have losses in the initial stages, however.  And such innovative business 
ventures might be considered the real engine of economic growth.  Moreover, tax sparing 
tends to encourage transfer pricing abuse.  Even if one grants the argument that tax 
sparing can influence investment location, it may contribute little to growth while 
reducing host country corporate tax revenue. 
 
Shifting of Corporate Residence 
 What determines the home country of a multinational corporation?  This differs 
somewhat across countries, but is often triggered by where the parent is incorporated or 
by the place of the headquarters (regardless of incorporation) that is considered to be the 
place of management and control.  Countries need to be concerned about whether a 
multinational corporation is considered resident since this determines whose tax rules 
apply. 
 Companies sometimes find it in their interest to change their place of 
incorporation to reduce taxes.  This has been dubbed “inversion,” and has been alleged to 
have been a factor in the Daimler-Chrysler merger.  US companies have recently come 
under fire for attempting such re-incorporations.  Stanley Works, for instance, first 
announced it would change its residence to Bermuda, but later reversed its decision in the 
face of both political and shareholder objections. 
 
 
                                                 
5 However, the U.S. has had a set of rules (contained in Section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code) 
that provide tax subsidies for corporations that locate in U.S. Possessions (the primary beneficiary being 
Puerto Rico).  This subsidy is being eliminated. 
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Shifting of Income through Transfer Prices 
 Transfer prices are the prices attached to transactions that occur between the 
parent and subsidiary companies within a multinational, such as the sale by a subsidiary 
of an input that is used in the parent's production process or sale of a trademark by the 
parent to a subsidiary.  Transfer prices are troublesome from a tax policy perspective 
because they can be used to evade taxes for either the territorial or the worldwide tax 
system.  Abuses under the territorial system are perhaps the most obvious: taxes can be 
reduced by transferring profits out of the high-tax country and into the low-tax country.  
A purported advantage of the worldwide system is that this incentive disappears for a 
multinational that invests in a single foreign country with a tax rate lower than the home 
country.  In this case, income derived from the foreign investment will be taxed at the 
home country tax rate and the incentive to shift income is eliminated.  However, several 
complications of the tax systems of countries that use the worldwide system of taxation 
may induce multinationals to use transfer pricing to reduce taxes.  For instance, since 
multinationals typically have investments in a variety of foreign countries, the way in 
which the credit is computed is important.  As mentioned earlier, some countries 
aggregate income over all foreign countries in determining the limit.  In addition, the use 
of Amixer@ companies in countries that use a per-country limitation can also result in 
income averaging.  For these countries, a multinational with a large proportion of income 
coming from investments in high tax countries and a small proportion of income coming 
from investments in low tax foreign countries will not obtain full credit for foreign taxes 
paid.  This firm would then have an incentive to use transfer prices to shift income from 
high tax to low tax foreign countries and thereby obtain credit for all foreign taxes paid. 
 As transfer pricing can be used to evade taxes, governments have naturally 
developed a set of rules to try to minimize this potential source of tax evasion.  The 
problem is to find an Aobjective@ way of valuing tangible and intangible assets transferred 
across national boundaries by multinational corporations.  The widely accepted 
international standard is that such transfers be assigned the prices that would have been 
charged if the transactions had occurred between independent entities.  Such prices are 
referred to as Aarm's length@ prices - that a transaction between a parent and its subsidiary 
should be priced as if it had occurred between two unrelated parties in a competitive 
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market.  However, arm’s length transfer prices are not always easy to calculate because 
comparable transactions by unrelated parties may not exist. This issue is pervasive for 
intangible assets because the value of most intangible asset arises from market power 
generated by the intangible. 
 When comparable transactions do not exist, the government often provides some 
guidance in the form of regulations or case law on the range of transfer prices that will be 
deemed acceptable.  Such guidance may include a cost-plus calculation, reference to 
some industry average such as a rate of return on assets or a margin on sales, or attempts 
to adjust Ainexact@ comparables to obtain transfer prices.  Profit-based methods (e.g. 
Acomparable profits@) as opposed to transactions methods tend to be the most 
controversial; some countries do not allow comparable profits methods.  The U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has adopted an open approach on the methods used to 
obtain transfer prices.  Multinational companies may now propose a method for 
determining transfer prices.  The IRS examines the proposed method and determines 
whether or not the methodology is acceptable. If the methodology is acceptable, the IRS 
enters into an Aadvanced pricing agreement@ (APA) with the multinational. The 
agreement allows the multinational to use the mutually agreed upon methodology to set 
transfer prices for the firm; the APA may involve the other countries impacted by the 
agreed transfer price.  APAs are also possible in some other countries (e.g. Germany and 
The Netherlands). 
 Transfer pricing abuses are not easy to discover, however, as they are internal to 
the firm, and, as suggested in Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1993) there are several 
reasons other than transfer pricing that might explain lower than average rates of return 
for foreign-controlled companies.  For instance, foreign-owned companies may at first 
experience a lower than average rate of return because of the start-up costs of a new 
business (or revaluation of the assets of new acquisitions), but one would expect this to 
change over time as the firms mature.  In addition, unexpected changes in exchange rates 
can have a large effect on profits at any given time.  Effective enforcement of transfer 
pricing rules requires effective tax administration. 
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The Role of Tax Treaties, Withholding Taxes and Information 
Exchange 
 Tax treaties are bilateral agreements that evolved from recommendations by the 
League of Nations in 1927.  A main function of tax treaties is to reduce Awithholding 
taxes,@ particularly those placed on dividends, interest, and royalties.  These are taxes 
applied at source, usually on gross income.  For instance, an Italian company issuing 
dividends to its British parent might owe a tax to Italy that would be withheld by the 
Italian government.  One reason often given for withholding taxes is that income of this 
type might easily escape both home and host taxation.  Withholding taxes on dividends 
can vary widely; this can create incentives to funnel dividends through a third, low 
withholding-tax country.  (Giovannini (1989) provides an example.) 
 
Subtleties in the Taxation of Financial Services 
 Given the growing importance of FDI in the services sector, particularly in 
finance, it is useful to consider certain subtleties of the taxation of the financial services 
sector.  Financial services are usually taxed somewhat differently than manufacturing 
companies for reasons that stem from the fact that interest income is a normal course of 
business in banking.  Hence, certain law changes that might not have much effect on the 
manufacturing sector could have a substantial impact on the financial services sector. 
 One example of this has been investigated by Altshuler and Hubbard (2001) with 
respect to the U.S. multinational service sector.  They note that Subpart F in the U.S. was 
greatly broadened by TRA86 to include current taxation of active financial service 
income.  After the law change, a U.S. multinational that does not have excess foreign tax 
credits would face equal taxation among locations abroad on its financial service income 
(i.e. it would face the U.S. tax rate on the margin in all locations) and therefore would not 
respond to tax differences. Using a sample of financial subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, 
Altshuler and Hubbard find that the location of financial subsidiary assets among foreign 
countries was sensitive to differential foreign tax rates in 1984, but not in 1992 or 1994.  
They attribute this to the essential repeal of deferral for these companies after 1986.  A 
host country that recognizes this change and whose FDI in the service sector comes 
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primarily from the U.S. could take advantage of this by increasing its tax rate to the U.S. 
rate to raise revenue. 
  
Conclusion: Challenges that lie ahead  
 The incentives resulting from taxation of FDI are, a-priori, difficult to analyze and 
difficult to predict.   This is due in part to the diversity of FDI both in terms of sectors 
and geographic origin for different countries, and the way that FDI changes over time 
independently of taxes.  Host countries need to be aware of the types and origins of FDI, 
and their different tax treatments in the home countries to be able to design effective 
incentive systems.  Home tax systems may themselves change over time (witness the 
U.S. moves toward territorial taxation), making the task even more difficult. 
 Developed countries may find the task feasible – some developed countries may 
even lead the process.  But a developing country’s lack of resources and expertise put it 
in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis developed countries to compete using tax 
incentives.  Even the common tax holiday incentive may just give up revenue without 
getting any additional investment in return to the extent that credit is given for taxes paid 
abroad, and a foreign tax credit computation that uses country averaging makes it quite 
difficult to discern the marginal impact of a tax holiday from any given country.  
Moreover, start-up ventures that generate losses, but are also the foundation of 
innovation, are disadvantaged relative to other business ventures. 
 The challenges for developing and developed countries would thus seem to be 
different.  Developing countries need foreign capital, but are in a “no-win” situation with 
respect to attracting FDI by using tax incentives.  They seem likely to lose revenue 
without attracting additional FDI.  Developing countries will probably do better by 
concentrating on improving investment fundamentals rather than using the tax system as 
the main incentive tool. 
 Developed countries, on the other hand, have an advantage in using tax incentives 
to attract FDI.  However developed countries might do better by recognizing the benefits 
of cooperating in certain respects.  The challenges for developed countries will likely 
come in recognizing the increasing need for cooperation in exchange of information to 
deal with the increasingly important service (including financial) sector, the difficult 
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issue of controlling transfer pricing, and money laundering.  Developed countries may 
well need to help developing countries in monitoring and tax administration as 
developing countries do not have the expertise to fully monitor transactions. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Changes in Shares of World FDI Stock, GDP, and Corporate Tax Revenue  
     in Developed and Developing Countries 
   Developing Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
% change in inward share of world FDI stock (1990 – 2000) +16.9 -9.4 
% change in outward share of world FDI stock (1990 – 2000) +80.7 -6.9 
% change in real per-capita GDP (1990 – 2001) +2.9 +1.7 
% change in corporate tax revenues as % of GDP (1992-2001) -20.1 +31.6 
Source: UNCTAD (2004) and Keen and Simone (2004). 
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Table 2: Top ten Foreign Direct Investment host economies in 2001 (millions of dollars) 
Developed countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
United States 103,398 174,434 283,376 300,912 124,435 
United Kingdom 33,229 74,324 87,973 116,552 53,799 
France 23,174 30,984 47,070 42,930 52,623 
Belgium and Luxembourg 11,998 22,691 133,059 245,561 50,996 
Netherlands 11,132 36,964 41,289 52,453 50,471 
Germany 12,244 24,593 54,754 195,122 31,833 
Canada 11,527 22,809 24,435 66,617 27,465 
Spain 7,697 11,797 15,758 37,523 21,781 
Italy 3,700 2,635 6,911 13,377 14,873 
Sweden 10,968 19,564 60,850 23,367 12,734 
  
Developing countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
China 44,237 43,751 40,319 40,772 46,846 
Mexico 14,044 11,933 12,534 14,706 24,731 
Hong Kong, China 11,368 14,770 24,596 61,938 22,834 
Brazil 18,993 28,856 28,578 32,779 22,457 
Bermuda 2,928 5,399 9,470 10,980 9,859 
Poland 4,908 6,365 7,270 9,342 8,830 
Singapore 10,746 6,389 11,803 5,407 8,609 
South Africa 3,817 561 1,502 888 6,653 
Chile 5,219 4,638 9,221 3,674 5,508 
Czech Republic 1,300 3,718 6,324 4,986 4,916 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 
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Table 3: Types of FDI Incentives in OECD and Developing Countries 
FDI Incentive 
% OECD 
Countries 
% Developing 
Countries 
Capital goods import duties exempted 5 56 
Tax exemption/holiday 20 55 
Investment/reinvestment allowance 30 49 
Lower tax rate 5 45 
VAT exemption for capital goods 0 34 
Accelerated depreciation 30 30 
Raw material import duties exempted 5 30 
VAT exemption for raw materials 5 24 
Duty drawback 5 24 
Export income treated preferentially 0 20 
Loss write-off 0 18 
Reduction in local, municipal taxes/duties 30 18 
VAT exemption on exported inputs 10 18 
Subsidized loans 45 18 
Source: World Bank (2003) from Bora (2002). 
